Disasters and Public Policy

BP, Massey Coal Mine, Katrina: Unnatural Disasters, Years in the Making

Some disasters are natural, and some are man-made.  Hurricane Katrina was a violent hurricane, but it is remembered principally for the shocking failure of the government's response to the devastating effects of the storm. The BP Oil Spill and the Massey Coal Mine Disaster are entirely "unnatural," in the sense that nature played no part in creating the deadly disasters; it was merely a backdrop.  What claimed lives -- 29 in the Massey mine in West Virginia and 11 in the Gulf of Mexico -- and what created an ecological nightmare in the case of BP, was the policy decisionmaking and the failed enforcement of regulations.  Company officials made choices that put profit ahead of safety, policymakers made decisions that created the context for that recklessness, and regulators missed chances to enforce safety requirements. Human decisions, all.
 
CPR's Member Scholars have focused considerable attention on these unnatural disasters, publishing a lengthy analysis of the bad policy choices that compounded Katrina's damage within days after the storm, and helping focus the public discussion of BP's and Massey's disasters on the various policy choices that made them possible. 
 

BP Oil Spill / The Massey Mine Disaster

CPR's Member Scholars are exploring the various issues related to two 2010 disasters -- the BP Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico (11 lives and untold ecological harm) and the Massey Coal Mine Disaster in West Virginia (29 lives).  The Member Scholars are preparing a variety of publications on the subject.  CPRBlog has carried a number of entries related to both.

 

Katrina

Among the more significant pre-storm failures that contributed to the scope of the damage: inadequate levees and botched supervision of levee construction by the Army Corps of Engineers; wetlands policies and under-funding of restoration efforts, leading to a lack of natural barriers and absorption of floodwaters; failed toxic waste cleanup efforts that allowed toxics to ooze into floodwaters; the de-emphasizing and under-funding of the federal government’s emergency response capacity by the Bush Administration; and more. These and other bad policy choices are laid bare in CPR’s groundbreaking examination of the disaster’s antecedents, Unnatural Disaster: The Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, published in September 2005.

 

In the days immediately following the disaster, in an effort to defend or at least distract attention from the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s manifest failure, some conservative critics charged that a late 1970s lawsuit brought by New Orleans commercial and environmental organizations had “caused” the disaster, by scuttling an Army Corps of Engineers levee plan. CPR Member Scholars quickly issued a report documenting otherwise, Broken Levees: Why They Failed. The Corps had failed to file an even remotely adequate environmental impact statement, as the law requires, and the judge in the case ordered the Corps to conduct such analysis before proceeding with construction. The Corps subsequently opted for a different design for reasons unrelated to the litigation.

 

Learn more about CPR’s work in the aftermath of Katrina: